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DECLARATORY ACTIONS AS "CASES" OR "CONTROVERSIES"
The United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Lib-
erty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 47 Sup. Ct. 282 (1927) has given
an interpretation to the words "cases" or "controversies" which,
if persisted in, seriously threatens the action for a declaratory
judgment as a form of action. This would be the more unfortu-
nate, for it does not appear from the opinion thatthe scope and pur-
pose of the declaratory action as a form of procedure were ade-
quately argued before the court.,
1 See the discussion of "cause of action" under the English declaratory
[ 845]
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Kentucky enacted a statute in 1924 2 requiring tobacco ware-
housemen who shall receive leaf tobacco for sale at public auc-
tion, to post notices stating the name and address of the pro-
ducer or owner whose tobacco would each day be offered for
sale, together with the number of pounds sold and the price re-
ceived on behalf of each seller, under penalty of a fine of $50 to
$100 per day for violations. It appears that the statute was in-
stigated by a large tobacco co-operative marketing association
to force the independent growers and producers into the associa-
tion. Certain Kentucky warehousemen at once brought actions
in the Kentucky courts under the Kentucky Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, 3 citing the commonwealth attorney as defendant,
for a declaration that the Warehouse Act was unconstitutional,
because of improper classification, unwarranted burdens con-
stituting lack of due process, interference with interstate com-
merce and violation of the anti-trust law. The Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, as is necessarily implied even if unexpressed, provided
that an "actual controversy" must exist as a condition of juris-
diction.4  The Kentucky court, apparently without the slightest
hesitation and as a matter of course, rendered a declaratory
judgment holding the Warehouse Act constitutional. r In sus-
taining the declaratory judgment procedure in the case, the Ken-
tucky court was obviously right.
Certain non-resident warehousemen, not satisfied with the
Kentucky result, then brought an action in the federal district
court for Kentucky under the federal Conformity Act 0 against
the commonwealth attorney charged with the duty of enforcing
the Warehouse Act and who, it was alleged, had already pre-
pared indictments against the plaintiffs, for a declaration or
declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional for the
reasons above mentioned and that they were not subject to the
judgment rule of court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay [1915] 2 X. 13.
536. "Cause of action" may be deemed even a narrower term than the
American ."case" or "controversy."
2 Ky. Acts 1924, c. 10.
S Ky. Acts 1922, c. 83.
4 As to the possibility for misconceptions of the phrase "actual con-
troversy" see (1926) 35 YA= LAW JOURNAL, 473, 475-476.
5 Jewell Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Kemper, 206 Ky. 667, 268 S. W.
324 (1925).
6 17 Stat. 197 (1872), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1537. The principal
clause reads: "the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding
in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the [circuit or]
district court, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings,
and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in
the courts of record of the State within which such [circuit or] district
courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding." See
Coffey v. United States, 117 U. S. 233, 234, 6 Sup. Ct. 717 (1886). An
extended account of the history and application of the Conformity Act
will be found in 25 C. J. 797 et seq.
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penalties provided for in the Act. The district court declined
to exercise jurisdiction under the Conformity Act. On appeal
by direct writ of error to the Supreme Court, that court not only
has affirmed the decision as to the impropriety of thus using the
Conformity Act in a matter, according to the court, not involv-
ing a question of "practice, pleading and forms and modes of
proceeding" but has added that the issue presented no "case"
or "controversy" within the meaning of article 3, section 2, of
the federal Constitution. 7
Although the action for a declaration, kmown by other names
but long used under specific circumstances in the United States,
does, in our opinion, involve distinctly matters of "practice, plead-
ings and forms and modes of proceeding," it is possible that the re-
sult reached in the case may be sustained for reasons not re-
ferred to by the court. Congress has, by section 266 of the Judi-
cial Code, surrounded with specific safeguards, such as the pro-
vision for three judges, the grant of injunctions by federal
courts against the enforcement of state statutes. It may there-
fore be proper not to permit these limitations to be evaded by
invoking in the federal courts the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure under the Conformity Act in those states which authorize
their courts to render declaratory judgments. Possibly the pro-
posed Federal Declaratory Judgment Act should take this mat-
ter into account. But it is our belief that the court in the
Liberty Warehose case erred in assuming and concluding that
the issue before the court did not present a "case" or "contro-
versy," as that term had been defined by the Supreme Court.
An examination of the opinion of Justice Sanford, together with
the authorities cited by him, will, it is believed, sustain the
writer's conclusion.
The opinion states that "the sole purpose of the petition, is to
obtain a declaration from the District Court of the rights and
duties of the plaintiffs under the Warehouse Act of 1924, and a
determination of the extent to which they must comply with its
provisions in the conduct of their business." This is only a par-
tial statement of the petition, although the plaintiffs doubtless
aroused the prejudice of the court by the awkward drafting of
this paragraph. s This should not, however, have misled the
7 "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority: . . to Con-
troversies . . . between Citizens of different states" ctc.
8 This one paragraph of the petition, which appears to have aroused the
courts antagonism, stated that the plaintiffs were maling the application
"for the purpose of securing a declaration of their rights and duties under
such Acts of 1924, and for the purpose of having this court determine
whether in the conduct of their business, it will be necessary for them to
comply with the provisions of said Act of 1924, or whether Chapter 10
YALE LAW JOURNAL
court. The petition requested a declaration that the Ware-
house Act was unconstitutional and invalid, and that the plain-
tiffs were not subject to the prescribed penalties, the identical
prayer that would have accompanied a bill for an injunction, ex-
cept that injunctive relief was not requested. The language
used by the court might convey the impression that the plaintiffs
were asking for some strange kind of declaration as to how to
run their business, whereas, essentially, they asked only a declar-
ation that the Act was unconstitutional. The Court then goes
on to say: "While the Commonwealth Attorney is made a de-
fendant as a representative of the Commonwealth, there is no
semblance of any adverse litigation with him individually; there
being neither any allegation that the plaintiffs have done or con-
template doing any of the things forbidden by the Act before
being advised by the court as to their rights nor any allegation
that the Commonwealth Attorney has threatened to take or con-
templates taking any action against them for any violation of the
Act, either past or prospective. And no relief of any kind is
prayed against him, by restraining action on his part or other-
wise."
This, then, is the nub of the basis for the court's belief that
the issue presented no "case" or "controversy." The reasoning
deserves examination. When an injunction is sought against an
Attorney General to prevent the enforcement of a statute, D there
of the Acts of 1924 is invalid in whole or in part, and if so, in what part."
This form of petition is to be condemned, for it looks as if the plaintiff is
asking for an advisory opinion, which the court would naturally refuse.
The awkward form misled the Michigan court in Anway v. Grand Rapids
Ry., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350, 12 A. L. R. 26, 62 (1920) into a con-
fusion of declaratory judgments with advisory opinions, a conclusion which
brought upon the court the practically unanimous condemnation of the
commentators. (1920) 19 MicH. L. Ray. 86; (1920) 30 YALE LAW Jon-
NAL, 161; (1921) 21 COL. L. Ray. 168; (1922) 4 ILL. L. Q. 126; (1920)
6 A. B. A. J. 495; (1921). 7 ibid. 141; (1922) 7 CORN. L. Q. 255; Rice, The
Constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment (1921) 28 IV. VA. L. Q. 1;
Schoonmaker, Declaratory Judgment (1921) 5 MINN. L. REv. 172. Since
then the Declaratory Judgment Act has been held constitutional wherever
challenged, with emphasis on the fact that it clearly presented a justiciable
issue, with adverse parties, and a final judgment-in other words, a "case"
or "controversy." See State v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pae. 82 (1921);
Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190 Calif. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923); Miller v. Miller,
149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1924); Kariher's Petition No. 1, 284 Pa.
455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925). Knowing that most of our courts are hostile to
anything which has even the appearance of novelty, lawyers should be
careful to frame petitions so as to request a declaration of specific findings,
and not ask generally for a declaration of their rights, as if seeking
merely advice. But the Supreme Court should not have been misled by
an awkwardly framed paragraph into a misconception of the plaintiff's
petition.
9 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923) ; Truax v.
Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915); Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S.
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is no adverse litigation with him individually, but only in his
official capacity as the enforcer of the law. That is what the
defendant was in the instant case, and he had, in fact, it ap-
pears, prepared indictments against the plaintiffs. It is under-
stood that they have since been fined. But even if he had pre-
pared no indictments, the mere existence of the statute was a
threat to the plaintiffs' business and gave them a clear right to
an injunction, had they sought it. A fortiori, they were entitled
to the milder relief by declaration of rights, merely a judgment
that the Act was unconstitutional. The term "declaration of
rights" is a term of art, sanctioned by usage in England since
1852, and in Scotland since the sixteenth century. It should not
have aroused judicial hostility. How is it possible that the issue
presents a "case" or "controversy" when the prayer is for an
injunction, but not a "case" or "controversy" when a mere dec-
laration is sought? That the court apparently misconceived the
nature of the declaratory action, is indicated by its assertion
that, evidently to the court's surprise and allegedly supporting
its conviction that no "controversy" was involved, "no relief of
any kind is prayed against him." But the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the Warehouse Act and of the plaintiffs'
immunity from its penalties, is all the relief they required.
Perhaps this seemed novel to the court, but for many years this
has been the way in which the validity of statutes and ordinances
and of official action under legislative authority has been chal-
lenged in England and throughout the British colonies and in
those of our states that have enacted a declaratory judgment
statute. 10 The writer cannot escape the conviction that the
court was not informed by counsel as to what a declaratory judg-
ment was. The extensive literature on this subject is not even
mentioned by the court, and there is no evidence that any of it
was examined. In a request for an injunction against the en-
forcement of an unconstitutional statute aimed at the plaintiffs,
it is not usual to allege "that the plaintiffs have done or con-
template doing any of the things forbidden by the Act," notably
when relief is sought from newly imposed burdens, nor to allege
"that the Commonwealth Attorney has threatened to take or
contemplates taking any action against them for any violation
of the Act." 1 The very fact that they had, under penalty, to
140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (1924) ; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 200 U. S.
497, 45 Sup. Ct. 141 (1925); Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Cline, 9 Fed. (2d)
176 (D. Colo. 1925); Tyson v. Banton, U. S. Supreme Court, No. 201,
decided Feb. 28, 1927.
10 See the numerous cases involving the construction or interpretation of
statutes and ordinances or of administrative action under them cited in
(1918) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 135-136, and in (1926) ibd. 477, notes 14
and 15.
" The statute imposed new duties and forbade nothing, except, by
849
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change their mode of doing business, in order to comply with
the Act, is a sufficient allegation of injury, and lays the founda-
tion for relief against the enforcement of the statute. Declara-
tory relief was as effective as coercive relief. In Village of Euc-
lid v. Ambler Realty Co.,12 where the mere enactment of a zon-
ing ordinance, without any attempt to apply it to the plaintiff,
was deemed a sufficient basis for injunctive relief, the court said
that "the existence and maintenance of the ordinance, in effect,
constitutes a present invasion of appellee's property rights and
a threat to continue it." So in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,13 the
court enjoined the enforcement of an Oregon statute two years
before it was to come into effect on the ground that the plain-
tiffs had a present interest to prevent a future interference
with their privilege to have pupils enter their parochial schools.
Leaving aside the fact that indictments had been prepared, the
mere existence of the Kentucky Warehouse Act, with its heavy
penalties, was a threat against the plaintiffs' business, more
immediate than the injury threatened by the Euclid zoning law
or the Oregon school law. Its very existence is a command to
the Attorney General to enforce it. No special threat to en-
force a statute has heretofore been required as a condition of
jurisdiction to issue an injunction. The statute imposing the
duty to enforce presents the Attorney General as an "adverse"
party and the issue as a "case" or "controversy." Had the
plaintiffs prayed an injunction, it is hard to believe, in the light
of the cases mentioned, that the court would have declined it or
would have thought that the issue presented no "controversy."
The fact is that the writ of injunction has been stretched far
beyond its original scope for the very purpose of enabling con-
stitutional questions to be presented for decision. The injunc-
tion constitutes only a plausible form of proceeding for obtaining
from the,court a declaration of orights or declaratory judgment.
The injunction is a blind. When, therefore, a plaintiff honestly
asks for the declaration of unconstitutionality which alone he
seeks and which will answer all his and the Attorney General's
purposes, why should the court deny him this relief? The stat-
ute, penal in effect, is aimed directly at him and his business
penalty, breach of the new duties. The court should not, it is respectfully
submitted, have used the words "before being advised by the court as to
their rights" (italics mine). The word "advised" seems sententious.
1247 Sup. Ct. 114 (U. S. 1926). Cf. West v. City of Wichita, 118 Ian.
265, 267, 234 Pac. 978, 979 (1925) where a declaratory judgment to have
a zoning law declared invalid was refused, because the plaintiff did not
state specifically enough the purpose for which he desired to use his prop-
erty. In Terrace v. Thompson, supra note 9, the court says: "The
threatened enforcement of the law deters them." In the Liberty Ware-
house case, indictments had actually been prepared against the plaintiffs,
under which they have since been fined.
13 268 U. S. 510, 535, 45 Sup. Ct. 571, 573 (1925).
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and the Attorney General is lawfully charged with its enforce-
ment. Can any clearer case be imagined of adverse parties
presently interested in an issue involving threatened property
rights? I
But the declaratory judgment serves another useful purpose.
It often happens that courts are unwilling to grant injunctions
to restrain the enforcement of penal statutes or ordinances and
relegate the plaintiff to his option either to violate the statute,
and take his chances in testing constitutionality on a criminal
prosecution, or else to forego under fear of prosecution the exer-
cise of his claimed rights. Into this dilemma no civilized legal
system operating under a constitution should force any person.
The court, in effect, by refusing an injunction, informs the pro-
spective victim that the only way to determine whether the sus-
pect is a mushroom or a toadstool is to eat it. Assuming that
the plaintiff has a vital interest in the enforcement of the chal-
lenged statute or ordinance, there is no reason why a declara-
tory judgment should not be issued instead of compelling a vio-
lation of the statute as a condition precedent to challenging its
constitutionality.4
The authorities cited by the Supreme Court in support of its
decision in the Liberty W'areho:se case do not seem to the wr.iter,
with all respect, to be relevant to the issue before the court. In-
deed, the reasoning of the cases cited seems to lead to the oppo-
site result, for the conditions of fact in the Libety case meet
squarely all the requirements laid down for a "case" or "contro-
versy." Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn ,. Uizited States Banik
had explained that the judicial "power is capable of acting only
when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his
rights in the form prescribed by law." is In the Gordoa case 2C
the decision of the court would not have been final, because sub-
ject to review by the Treasury Department. Obviously jurisdic-
tion was declined. So appellate jurisdiction from an administra-
tive determination, and not a judgment, cannot be conferred on
the Supreme Court. 17 In the Mu:kret case, 16 Congress con-
1 See Shredded Wheat Co. v. City of Elgin, 2S4 Ill. 3S9, 120 N. E. 218
(1918). If the ordinanae was invalid, said the court, the prosecution
would fail and the plaintiff would not be injured; if it was valid, there
was no ground on which its enforcement should be enjoined. See also
Iowa Motor Vehicle Ass'n v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 209 N. W.
511 (Iowa, 1926). See (1926) 12 IowA L. Rrvi. 62, 65.
I5 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824). So in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pat.
1, 75 (U. S. 1831): "It is only where the rights of persons or property
are involved, and when such rights can be presented under some judicial
form of proceedings, that courts of justice can interpose relief."
26 Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697 (1804).
27 Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U. S. 428, 444, 43 Sup. CL 445,
449 (1923); Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 47 Sup. Ct. 234
(U. S. 1927); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 357, 31 Sup. Ct. 250,
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ferred on named Indians the privilege of suing in the Court of
Claims to determine the constitutionality of a prior Act. There
was no evidence that the Indians named had any personal in-
terest in the matter, that any property of theirs would be affected
by the decision or that any party or officer had any adverse in-
terest. The elements of an adversary proceeding involving
plaintiffs' or defendants' interests were lacking. How this case
could be confused with the declaratory action is only explainable
by the inference that either the former or the latter are mis-
understood. In Fairchild v. Hughes,0 a taxpayer sought to en-
join the proclamation by the Secretary of State of the Nineteenth
Amendment and was dismissed because his interest was deemed
insufficient and because the issue before the court was not one
"for determination by such regular proceedings as are estab-
lished by law or custom for the protection or enforcement of
rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs."
State courts are much more willing than the federal courts to
see in a taxpayer a person having sufficient interest to challenge
a statute requiring the expenditure of money or official action.
In such a case the court has said: 20 "The party who invokes the
judicial power must be able to show not only that the statute
is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in com-
mon with people generally." Certainly the Liberty Warehouse
Company met this requirement.
On several occasions states have sought to prevent the en-
forcement of federal statutes. Leaving aside those in which
jurisdiction was refused because the issue raised was political, 21
the court seems to have leaned back pretty far in avoiding a
decision, not only where abuse of federal power was alleged in
matters of general public interest 22 but also where the property
254 (1911). See the opinion of Charles E. Hughes to the effect that the
Muskrat case presented no obstacle to the constitutionality of the de-
claratory judgment, in (1920). 53 CHICAGO LEGAL Nuws, 205.
18 Supra note 17.
19 258 U. S. 126, 42 Sup. Ct. 274 (1922).
20 See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 601
(1923).
21 Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50 (U. S. 1867) and similar cases.
22 See State of Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 258 U. S.
158, 162, 42 Sup. Ct. 261, 263 (1922) (effort of state to annul action of
Railroad Labor Board in raising wages of railroad employees in the state).
See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 601
(1923). (effort to have Federal Maternity Act declared void, because its
purpose was to induce the states to yield their sovereign rights. Jurisdic-
tion declined because state was under no obligation to make appropriation,
without which no federal appropriation was possible). As a taxpayer thus
cannot bring an action, in the federal courts, the state will, in order to
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rights of the state were most directly involved. .3 It seems un-
fortunate that the courts should take pains to refuse their aid
in settling controversies which involve adverse parties and dis-
turb important property interests, until actual damage is done.
But this is all the more reason why the declaratory action de-
signed to remove or dissipate clouds from the plaintiff's rights
before damage is done should be sustained, when properly before
the court in an adversary proceeding. For fifty years the Eng-
lish people and those of most of the British colonies and of sev-
eral European countries have had the benefit of this valuable
procedure. 24 No one there has suggested that an action for a
declaratory judgment involving adverse parties contesting gen-
nine and practical issues, does not present a justiciable "case"
or "controversy." If the procedure is understood, no one here
can legitimately reach such a conclusion. The danger is that the
opinion of the Supreme Court may discourage the enactment
by Congress of the statute authorizing the federal courts to
render declaratory judgments, notwithstanding the fact that the
bill unanimously passed the House in the 69th Congress, and may
induce some of our state courts which have welcomed the new
procedure to hesitate to extend its usefulness. It is to be hoped
that the Supreme Court will take an early occasion to re-examine
the declaratory action as a constitutional form of procedure.
E.M . B.
INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONFORMITY ACT
The Conformity Act provides that "the practice, pleadings,
and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than
equity and admiralty causes, in the district court shall conform
as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and
modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the
courts of record of the state within which such district courts
are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding" 1
test the Act, have to make an appropriation, and then perhaps a ta%:-
payer may enjoin the state appropriation. Even this attempt might fail.
23 See New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328, 330, 46 Sup. Ct. 122 (192G)
in which the state sought to enjoin the enforcement, as unconstitutional,
of the federal Water Power Act, on the ground that its proprietary interest
in its water resources from which it derived revenue would be impaired.
Because federal action to license the taking of water had not yet been
undertaken, the court thought the issue an "abstract question." It is hard
to believe that so vital and practical a question was "abstracl" See (1926)
35 YALE LAw J uRNAL, 867.
24 For the various ways in which the declaratory action has been em-
ployed in the British Empire and in the states of the United Statez, Eee
(1918) 28 YATx LAW JOURNAL, 1, 105, and (192G) 35 ibid. 473.
2 17 Stat 197 (1872), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1537.
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Its aim was said to be to relieve the legal practitioner of the
necessity of learning two distinct systems of procedure in the
law courts of the same locality. 2 A study of the many excep-
tions engrafted on the statute through judicial decision leads to
the conclusion that this purpose has largely failed of accom-
plishment.
No attempt shall be made to set forth all the numerous and
ever-increasing instances of nonconformity by the federal law
courts to state procedure. 3 Generally speaking, however, in ad-
dition to the exceptions contained in the statute itself, the Act
does not apply to any case in which the subject matter is con-
trolled by federal legislation, 4 nor when the effect of conformity
would be to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 1 That
the Act was "intended" to leave to the court a wide discretion in
its application is evidenced by the phrase "as near as may be ;"
and that expression has often been seized upon to avoid con-
formity, when strict adherence to state practice would "tend to
defeat the ends of justice." r
That the "ends of justice" may easily be defeated in the fed-
eral courts by following state procedure is well illustrated by the
recent case of N. & G. Taylor Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 14 Fed. (2d)
353 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926). The plaintiff, a corporation, sued for
breach of a contract. The declaration failed to set forth that
2 See Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426, 441 (1875).
3 For instances of nonconformity with state procedure in the federal
courts, see Appendix E to the Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial
Procedure (1926) 51 A. B. A. REP. 524, and preceding years; Clayton,
Uniform Federal Procedure (1917)- 84 CENT. L. J. 5, n. 6; (1922) 35 HAnV.
L. REv. 602, n. 20.
4 Bracken v. Union Pac. R. R., 56 Fed. 447 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893); Texas
R. R. v. Nelson, 50 Fed. 814 (C. C. A. 5th, 1892); Union Pac. Co. v. Bets-
ford, 141 U. S. 259, 11 Sup. Ct. 1000 (1891); Vicksburg & Meridian Ry. v.
Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 7 Sup. Ct. 1 (1886); Southern Pac. Ry. v. Denton,
146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct. 44 (1892) ; Hills & Co. v. Hoover, 220 U. S. 329,
31 Sup. Ct. 402 (1911).
Mexican Central Ry. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, 13 Sup. Ct. 859 (1893)
(Texas statute giving special appearance the effect of a general appear-
ance) ; Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437, 30 Sup. Ct.
125 (1910) (statute making return of service by sheriff conclusive on de-
fendant); Southern Photo Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 224 Fed. 523 (X. D.
Ga. 1915) (statute allowing jury trial where sufficiency of service is ques-
tioned by defendant).
6 "The conformity is required to be 'as near as may be'-not as near as
may be possible, or as near as may be practicable. This indefiniteness may
have been suggested for a purpose: it devolved upon the ,judges to be
affected the duty of construing and deciding, and gave them the power to
reject, as Congress doubtless expected they would do, any subordinate
provision in such State statutes which, in their judgment, would unwisely
encumber the administration of the law, or tend to defeat the ends of jus-




the plaintiff had been assigned the claim by a copartuership of
the same name, whose business the plaintiff had been organized
to take over. At the trial, five years after the commencement
of the action, the plaintiff was allowed to amend by setting forth
how and when it acquired title, such allegation being required
by an Illinois statute. The court held that since the Illinois Su-
preme Court had held such an amendment to set forth a new
cause of action, the federal court was bound by such decision;
that the statute of limitations had run against such action, and
hence that plaintiff failed. The dissenting opinion - pointed out
that "it was doubtful if the holding would have been adopted
by any other state of the union," that "whether the assignment
of the cause of action must be pleaded is not the determinative
question," but rather "whether the amended declaration changes
the cause of action from that stated or attempted to be stated
before the amendment." And the conclusion of the dissent was
that the question was not a matter of pleading and practice, but
one of substantive law on which the court was bound to form an
independent judgment, and therefore not to be governed by the
Conformity Act.
Can it be contended with any show of reason that in the prin-
cipal case the amendment introduced a new cause of action?
True, the Illinois courts have held that an amendment which
adds any necessary fact after the statute of limitations has run
states a new cause of action. s In contrast with this, however,
is the liberal practice adopted by the United States Supreme
Court, allowing an amendment from equity to law, 1 permitting
the plaintiff to recover in a different capacity under the amend-
ment than was alleged in the original declaration, Il allowing the
plaintiff to add an allegation that he was engaged in interstate
commerce, " or to amend from a common law or state statutory
action to one under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 22
These holdings of the Supreme Court are a recognition that the
cause of action is an aggregate of operative facts giving rise to
7Evans, J., at 356.
s The court relied on Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, 297 Ill. 444,
130 N. E. 736 (1921) (amendment setting forth assignment for firat time);
Prouty v. City of Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 95 N. E. 147 (1911) (averment
of notice added amendment); Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 IM. 259, 88
N. E. 651 (1909) (semble). See (1919) 28 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 603.
9 Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U. S. 207, 33 Sup. Ct. 450 (1913); see
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 1053.
o10 "The change was in form, rather than in substance." See Missouri, K.
& T. Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 576, 33 Sup. Ct. 135, 137 (1913).
11 Seaboard Air Line v. Renn, 241 U. S. 290, 36 Sup. Ct 567 (1916)
(holding that the amendment merely expanded what was alleged in sup-
port of the cause of action already asserted).
New York Central R. R. v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 43 Sup. Ct. 122
(1922).
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a right-duty relation enforceable in the courts, but not an iden-
tity of all such operative facts. "" In the principal case, the
amended declaration varied from the original only in setting
forth the capacity in which the plaintiff sued. As the same fac-
tual situation was presented in both, the defendant was as well
apprized of the case against him by the first declaration as by the
amended one; and it would seem that if he were sufficiently
warned of the facts involved, 14 although every minor detail were
not set forth, the statute of limitations should not be a bar on the
ground that the amendment sets forth a "new cause of action."
Another instance of conformity to an exceptional state statute
is brought out in the case of American Railway Express Co. v.
Rowe, 14 Fed. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926), where the declara-
tions of a deceased to his attorney as to the cause of his injury
were admitted in evidence in the federal court sitting in Massa-
chusetts pursuant to a statute of that state providing that decla-
rations of a deceased person should be admitted if the court
found they were made in good faith, before the commencement
of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant. 1
Again the dissenting opinion 10 upheld the view that there should
have been no adherence to state practice, because of the federal
statute providing that the mode of proof in law actions should
be by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open
123 The code cause of action has been defined as an "aggregate of operative
facts which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between two
or more persons."
See Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
817, 837. The "test is not absolute identity of all the operative facts, but
whether the number of operative facts common to each situation is suffi-
ciently large to make the treatment of the cause as a unit desirable for
convenient and efficient trial work." Ibid. 829. See ibid., note 64, for Illi-
nois rule. United States Supreme Court decisions have sustained this
view. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Wulf, supra note 10; Chicago, R. I. & P.
Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 46 Sup. Ct. 420 (1926); Reading Co. v.
Koons, 271 U. S. 58, Sup. Ct. (1926). Cf. the liberal New York rule as to
amendments, N. Y. C. P. A., § 111; and the federal statute, 1 Stat. 91
(1789), U. S., Coilp. Stat. (1916) § 1591, providing that the court may per-
mit either of the parties to the action to amend "any defect in the process
or pleadings, upon such conditions as it shall in its discretion and by its
rules prescribe." See also (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 326; Cf. (1924)
37 HARV. L. REV. 778; (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1016.
14 That the true function of pleading is served when the adverse party
is put on notice, see Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading
(1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 517, 544.
1 MAss. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 233, § 65. For the history of this statute,
unique in the law of evidence, see (1922) 8 MAss. L. Q. 67. The statute
has been in force for almost thirty years and is said to work well. See 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1576. Compare with the Connecticut
statute, which goes even further. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5735.
16 At 272.
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court. 17 In the field of evidence, as with other procedural ques-
tions, federal courts follow the state statutory rule in the ab-
sence of federal legislation, is and as a result there has been
conformity in some respects, as in regard to competency of wit-
nesses, 19 a physician's privilege 20 and compulsory examination of
plaintiff; 21 but failure to conform on such matters as deposi-
tions,22 discovery before trial,-3 and disqualification of survivors."4
In this, as in every other type of case involving the Conformity
Act, it is perhaps fair to say that no prediction can be made
with any degree of accuracy as to when the courts will or will
not conform to state practice.5 The statement that the Con-
formity Act is more honored in the breach than the observance 20
has much to support it as shown by numerous lists of exceptions
to the Act, of which one of the most interesting appears in the
Reports of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure of the
American Bar Association for 1926.27 The Bar Association, and
leaders of the bench and bar generally, have long fought for the
passage of a bill giving to the Supreme Court of the United
States authority to formulate rules of procedure for common law
actions in the federal courts, claiming that only in such a way
can nation-wide uniformity and a system of flexible, judge-made
rules be secured.2 3  Opponents of the bill point out that the
', Rev. Stat. (1878) § 861; U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 14103.
181 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 15, § 6. Conformity with state rules
of evidence is usually brought about under the corollary to the Conformity
Act, 1 Stat. 92 (1789), U. S. Comp. Stat. (191G) § 1538, providing that
"The laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties
or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."
19 Wrightv. Bales, 2 Black, 535 (U. S. 1862).
20 Connecticut B1. L. Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U. S. 250, 5 Sup.
Ct. 119 (1884).
21 Camden & S. R. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172, 20 Sup. Ct. 617 (1900).
22 Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, 5 Sup. Ct. 724 (13M5).
23 Hanks Dental Ass'n v. Tooth Crown Co., 194 U. S. 003, 21 Sup Ct. 700
(1904).24 Smith v. Au Gres Tp., 150 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 0th, 190G).
25 "The federal courts have been unable to frame a criterion which shall
distinguish unmistakably those instances in which they are bound to con-
form to the state practice from those in which they must differ therefrom
because required to conform but only 'as near as may be."' See Do Valle
Da Costa v. Southern Pac. Co., 167 Fed. 654, 657 (C. C. D. Mass. 1909).
26 Clayton, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7.
27 51 A. B. A. REP. 524 (1926) Appendix E, Report of Committee on Uni-
form Judicial Procedure. See also the similar Reports of preceding years.
28 For a chronology of the bill proposed and for an enumeration of many
leaders of the bench and bar and men in public life who have advocated
it passage, see Appendix B, Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial
Procedure, 51 A. B. A. REP. 519 (1926). Leading text writers have also
given it their support. See Pound, Regudation of Judicial Proccdurc (1915)
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Codes were not successful in bringing about the procedural re-
form that was hoped for from them, and prophesy that the
method provided for in the bill in question would be no more suc-
cessful.2 9  However, in view of the satisfactory working of the
federal rules of procedure in equity, admiralty, 0 bankruptcy 8
and copyright cases, 2 it may be urged that much of the confusion
and difficulty of practice under the Conformity Act would be
obviated by a system of rules evolved by the members of the
Supreme Court or by a body of experts on procedure. 3  The
practicing lawyer may prefer learning two definite systems, with
a resulting degree of certainty in predicting the action of the
courts, to the present situation which involves the necessity of
mastering one system and its already long and ever-increasing
number of exceptions, with no definite test to guide him as to
when a new exception will be made.
INTERMARRIAGE WITH NEGROES-A SURVEY OF STATE STATUTES
A bill prohibiting intermarriage between white persons and
Negroes was recently introduced in the Connecticut legislature
and referred to the Judiciar Committee, which reported it un-
10 ILL. L. Rav. 163; Morgan, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure (1918)
2 MINN. L. REv. 81; Scott, Actions at Law in the Federal Courts (1924) 38
HAuV. L. REV. 1.
29 See letter of Senator Thomas J. Walsh, of Montana, who has been
the leading exponent of this view, in the New York Times, Jan. 12, 1925,
at 14. See also the address of Senator Walsh before the Oregon Bar As-
sociation at Portland, Ore., Oct. 2, 1926, printed in (1927) A. B. A. Joun.
87; and reply thereto by Dean Roscoe Pound. Ibid. 84. The Senator bases
much of his criticism of the plan suggested on the failure of the Field Code
.of Civil Procedure in New York to achieve the simplicity and flexibility in
pleading which it was intended to accomplish. The difficulty of combining
certainty in pleading with sufficient flexibility to serve justice is conceded.
Perhaps the best way to avoid the pitfalls of the New York Code and the
frequent illiberal interpretation to which it has been subjected would be
for the compilers of the new system to see to it that New York procedure
did not dominate. Furthermore, if the Supreme Court were entrusted with
the rule making power it could at anytime amend the rules and thereby
overcome any tendency toward illiberal interpretation of them on the part
of the lower federal courts.
30 Practice in equity and admiralty cases is regulated by the Federal
Equity Rules, promulgated by the United States Supreme Court. 1 Stat.
93 (1789), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1536.
21 Practice in bankruptcy proceedings is regulated by various provisions
in the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, which provided that the United
States Supreme Court should prescribe the rules of procedure in such cases.
See 30 Stat. 554, § 30 (1898), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9614.
32 Practice in copyright cases is regulated by the United States Supreme
Court. See 35 Stat. 1082, § 25 (1909), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9546.
33See Clark, Procedural Reform and the Supreme Court (Aug., 1926)
AmERICAN MERCURY, 445, 448.
COMMENTS
favorably. This report was accepted and the bill was rejected.1
Similar bills are part of the law of twenty-nine of our states.
In these states the Negroes comprise from over fifty to less than
one per cent of the entire population.- The nineteen states
which have no such laws can neither be commended for lack of
prejudice, nor condemned for laxity in dealing with social prob-
lems, since in no one of these states do the Negroes comprise
more than five, while in seven of these states they actually form
less than one per cent of the total population.3 Of the ten states
which have similar statutes prohibiting marriages between white
persons and descendants of the Mongolian races, nine are west
of the Mississippi river.4  This is only another indication of the
fact that this type of legislation is but the reflection of a com-
'House Bill No. 65, January Session, 1927.
2Statistics here used as to the distribution of negro population are taken
from the U. S. Bureau of Census, Washington, 1921.
Miss. Ann. Code (Hemingway, 1917) c. 49, § 2551; S. C. Code (1922) §
378. In these two states the Negroes comprise over 50% of the total popu-
lation.
Ala. Civ. Code (1923) c. 187, §§ 5001-5002; Ga. Ann. Code (Michie, 1926)
§§ 2941-2943; La. Rev. Civ. Code (1925) Art. 94-95. In these three states
the Negroes comprise 371,-50% of the total population.
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford, 1921) c. 116, §§ 7039, 7043, 7045: Fla. Rev.
Gen. Stat. (1920) §§ 3938-3939; N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) c. 50, §§ 2495,
4340; Va. Gen. Laws (1923) §§ 4540, 4546, 5087, 5089. In these four
states the Negroes comprise 25-37M6% of the total population.
Del. Rev. Code (1915) § 2992; Md. Ann. Code (1925) Art. 27, §§ 361,
365; Tenn. Ann. Code Rev. (Shannon, 1918) § 4186; Tex. Civ. Code (1920)
art. 4613. In these four states the Negroes comprise 12, -25% of the total
population.
Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1915) c. 66, §§ 2097, 2098, 2101, 2114; Mo. Rev. Stat.
(1919) § 7299; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1921) § 7499; W. Va. Code Ann. (Barnes,
1923) c. 64, §§ 1, 3, c. 149, § 8. In these four states the Negroes comprise
5-12-',% of the total population.
Calif. Civ. Code (Deering, 1923) § 60; Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) c. 123, §
5548-5549; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) §§ 2S79, 9S62, 9805; Neb. Comp.
Stat. (1922) §§ 1491, 1505. In these four states the Negroes comprise 1-5%
of the total population.
Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919) § 4596; Mont. Rev. Code (Choate, 1921) §§
5700-5703; Nev. Rev. Laws (1912) §§ 6512, 6515; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1913) §§ 9582, 9583, 9587; S. D. Rev. Code (1919) §§ 128, 100; Wyo.
Comp. Stat. Ann. (1920) §§ 4972, 4973. In these six states the Negroes
comprise less than 17 of the total population.
3In Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan
(such marriages expressly made valid by Comp. Laws (1915) § 11307)
New Jersey, New Mexdco, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island,
the Negroes comprise from 1-5% of the total population. In Iowa, Maine,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin, the
Negroes comprise less than 1% of the total population.
4 California, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming.
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munity's attitude toward an alien minority group, which seems
to vary in intensity with the size of the group.5
The constitutionality of these statutes seems little disputed,'
although a survey of the cases reveals the rather surprising
fact that there are comparatively few decisions in appellate
courts squarely in point.7 The decisions in point are those of
state courts 8 with the exception of one federal decision, which
was handed down by a district court in Georgia in 1890.9
The wisdom of such legislation may well be questioned; rea-
sons advanced in its favor are largely mythical and seem based
on popular prejudice.0 They stress the importance of the pur-
5 Another indication of this is the fact that the proportion of mulattoes
to Negroes in any community varies inversely with the proportion of Ne-
groes to white persons. In other words the fewer the Negroes there are
in a community the less repugnance seems to be felt by white persons to
either cohabitation or intermarriage with Negroes. See REUTER, Tu,
MULATTO IN THE UNITED STATES (1918) 122.
6 (1906) 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 532; 18 R. C. L., Marriage, § 31; Frasher v.
State, 3 Tex. App. 263, 277 (1877); Ellis v. State, 42 Ala. 525 (1868);
Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150 (1875); Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231 (1881).
7 Of the Alabama cases cited, supra note 6, as sustaining the constitu-
tionality of statutes prohibiting marriage between white persons and Ne-
groes, one expressly states that the question of constitutionality is not be-
fore the court (Ellis v. State) ; a second expressly states that its decision
upholding a conviction for adultery between a white man and a negro
woman, does not decide the question of whether the state has the power
to prohibit intermarriage between a white person and a Negro (Ford v.
State) ; and a third also enforces the statute as against a negro man and
a white woman who had been guilty of fornication or adultery, but not
of intermarriage (Pace v. State).
8 The following cases squarely hold that statutes prohibiting intermar-
riage between Negroes and white persons are constitutional. Green v.
State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) (in overruling Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872)
the court said: "The amendments of the constitution were evidently de-
signed to secure to citizens without distinction of race rights of a civil
or political kind only, not such as are merely social, much less those of
a purely domestic nature. The regulation of these belongs to the state.");
Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S. W. 977 (1895) (conviction of negro man
married in good faith to white woman in 1874 and first prosecuted in
1891 affirmed, the court holding the statute prohibiting such marriage con-
stitutional) ; State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871). (holding that neither
the fourteenth amendment nor the Civil Rights Bill has impaired or abro-
gated the laws of this state on the subject of marriages of Whites and Ne-
groes) ; Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907) ; Frasher v.
State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877) (at 275, the court said: "if the Federal
government can determine who may marry in a state, there is no limit to
its power .... It may assume, exercise, and absorb all the powers of a
local and domestic character. This would result in the destruction of the
states"); Francois v. State, 9 Tex. App. 144 (1880); Blake v. Sessions, 99
Okla. 59, 220 Pac. 876 (1923).
9 State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (S. D. Ga. 1890).
lOT.V ENPoRT, HEREDITY OF SKIN COLOR IN NEGRO-WHITE CROSSES (Car-
negie Inst. of Wash. 1913) 29-30: "This brings us to a matter of great
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ty of the races, the inferiority of the cross-breed to either pure
race, and the loss to society through intermarriage between
members of the "superior" white race and members of the "in-
ferior" negro race. But scientists tell us that the races are
not pure,1 that psychological tests by no means show that the
mulatto is inferior to the "pure" Negro, 2- and that there is no
scientific basis for the assumption that the white race is superior
to the negro race.13  Still, the same type of reasoning forms the
basis of more than a few decisions.-,
social moment to hundreds of our citizens, namely the possibility of a re-
version in the offspring of a white-skinned descendant of a Negro to the
brown skin color. There is even a current opinion that such an extracted
white, may have a 'black' child. This tradition has been used to create
dramatic situations in novels and newspaper 'stories'; and the dread of
this tradition hangs over many a marriage that might othermise be quite
happy. In our studies no clear case of this sort has been found."
REuTr,, THn Almmmc., RACE PnoBmun (1927) 654G: In spcaking of the
theory of racial inferiority of the Negroes, this author says: "In spite of
the obvious difficulty of arriving at an objectively valid judgment and of
the practical consequences that may result from premature prcnouncfnemnt,
there is an almost unanimous prejudging of the problem. The general
popular opinion is doubtless to the effect that innate racial diferenccs . . .
not only eist but are so marked as to make possible a hierarchy of races
in terms of development along the scale of organic evolution.... In
America this doctrine has taken the e-xtreme form of a belief in the innate
superiority of the native-born American and especially in the mental su-
periority of the Nordic stock."
"1DosEY, WHY WE BDEHAV LixE HutAN BEINGS (1925) 44: "rUsing
'race' as synonymous with 'species', man is of one race. Hence the diffi-
culty in distinguishing even sub-species, sub-races, varieties, and types of
men; they overlap. The human species has interbred. There are no
biologically pure varieties and certainly no pure races, except possibly the
pigmy."
12 See KIOEBER, ANTHROPOLOGY (1923) 80-S1.
'3 HAvELocK ELLIs, MlAN AND WomtAN (1904) 25: "In some respects some
of the black races may be said to be more highly evolved than the white
European races." DORSmET op. cit. svpra note 11, at 38-59. The author
points out the various race characteristics of the negro race and the w:.hite
race which suggests a further or lesser degree in evolution from the ape.
"The idea of racial inferiority and superiority is not a prezent problem
of research among students; it is a matter of debate among laymen. For
approimately two decades there has been virtual agreement among
scholars; all accept as a provisional but fairly vell-founded working
hypothesis the position that the various races and peoples of the world are
essentially equal in mental ability and capacity for civilization." RhUt E,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 95.
".... racial inferiority and superiority are by no means self-evident
truths .... The belief in race inequalities is founded in emotion and ac-
tion and then justified by reasoning. That is, the belief is rationalized,
not primarily inferred by pure reason. It may be true, but it is not proved
true." KROEBER, op cit. svpra note 12, at 58-86.
14 See Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877) ("And surely there cannot be
any tyranny or injustice in requiring both [races] alike to form this union
with those of their own race only, whom God hath joined together by in-
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Assuming for a moment that the reasons set forth in favor of
such prohibitory statutes are all sound, we must still ask whether
"the evil" sought to be cured can be cured by statute, and if so;
by the type of statute prevalent in the United States. If the
aim of the statutes is substantially, or even materially to lessen
the mingling of the races, statistics give slight encouragement
as to the possible effect which the statutory prohibition of in-
termarriage may have in achieving that end. It is estimated
that one-third to tlh-ee-fourths of the Negroes in America already
show some signs of intermixture; that the mulatto population
increased 500% between 1850 and 1910, and that intermarriage
is only playing a negligible part in racial amalgamation."5
The statutes prohibiting intermarriage between white persons
and Negroes vary widely in their definition of "Negro," 10 as to
delible peculiarities which declare that He has made the two races dis-
tinct") ; Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231, 232 (1881) (upholding constitutionality
of statute more severely punishing adultery when between two persons of
different races: "Its result may be the amalgamation of the two races, pro-
ducing a mongrel population and a degraded civilization, the prevention of
which is dictated by a sound public policy affecting the highest interests of
society and government") ; State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 404 (1871) (citing
with approval the opinion in Phil. & Westchester R. R. v. Miles, 2 AA1. L.
Rv. 358 which said: "The natural law which forbids their [white and
black] intermarriage and that social amalgamation which leads to a cor-
ruption of races, is as clearly divine as that which imparted to them dif-
ferent natures") ; Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. 858, 869 (1878) ("The
purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of both races,
and the highest advancement of our' cherished southern civilization, under
which two distinct races are to work out and accomplish the destiny to
which the Almighty has assigned them on this continent-all require that
they should be kept distinct and separate, and that connections and alliances
so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them, should be pro-
hibited by positive law, and be subject to no evasion").
'15 R=R, op. cit. supra note 10, at 58, points out that: "The physical
characters of the negro population are being changed by the gradual dis-
semination of the white blood already in the race . . . It is variously esti-
mated that one-third, one-half, or even three-fourths of the American
Negroes already show some larger or smaller trace of intermixture." He
also states, at 60: "In 1910 the number of blacks was less than two and
one-half times as great as in 1850. The number of mulattoes, however,
was more than five times as great in 1910 as in 1850." At 126. "But
neither the severity of the law nor the intolerance of public sentiment (in
American pioneer society) seemed to have much effect on the miscegena-
tion of the races; they prevented intermarriage rather than race mixture.
The clandestine intermingling tended to increase." At 133: "At the pres-
ent time as in the past, intermarriage of the Negroes and whites is re-
sponsible for a negligible part of the racial amalgamation. In the period
since the Emancipation intermarriages have been rare. It is not possible
to know the exact number but such figures as are obtainable show the num-
ber to be negligible-an average of perhaps less than one hundred per
year."1
16 Some of the statutes prohibit marriages between white persons and
persons of African descent (Georgia, Oklahoma, Texas), or between white
862
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the nature of the offense, 17 and finally, and perhaps most im-
portant, as to the legal relations resulting from such marriages.
Twenty-six statutes provide that such a marriage shall be void,"0
while of the three which only declare that such a marriage is
unlawful or prohibited, at least one, Oklahoma, has by judicial
interpretation determined that such a marriage shall have no
legal effect."9 A mere declaration that such a marriage is "void"
or "null and void" does not settle all problems as to resulting
legal relations. MIost of the statutes are silent as to the effect
on the legitimacy of the children, but it seems that if the mar-
riage is expressly declared void rather than voidable the children
will be held illegitimate in the absence of a statutory provision to
the contrary. 10 The children, therefore, are made to bear the
burden of illegitimacy with its deprivation of the rights of heirs
in addition to the inevitable social and economic disabilities under
which mulattoes live in the United States.2
persons and persons of negro blood to the third generation (Alabama,
Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee), or between white persons and per-
sons of more than one-fourth (Oregon, West Virginia), or one-eighth
(Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota), or one-sixteenth
(Virginia) negro blood; other statutes in more general terms prohibit mar-
riages between white persons and Negroes or mulattoes (Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming).
27 In some cases the statutes expressly declare that persons violating the
prohibition shall be guilty of a felony (Oklahoma, Tennessee), or an in-
famous crime (North Carolina), or a gross misdemeanor (Nevada), or a
misdemeanor (South Carolina) with the more or less severe prison terms
and fines attendant on such offenses.
Is Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missisippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. The
courts have frequently held that since such marriages are void they may
be attacked collaterally. Carter v. Veith, 139 La. 534, 71 So. 792 (1916).
19 Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924). The other two
states are Nevada and Tennessee.
20 Moore v. Moore, 98 S. W. 1027 (Ky. 1907) (even where subsequent
valid marriage by parents in another state); Greenbow v. James, 80 Va.
636 (1885). Contra: Succession of Caballero, 24 La. Ann. 573 (1872) (white
man and negro woman, who had been living together in Louisiana, were
married under Spanish law, intending to remain in Spain. There they
legitimated their daughter and she became their lawful heir in Louisiana).
2 1 The Florida statute, supra note 2, reads: ".. unlawful for any white
male residing or being in this state to intermarry with any negro ...
and every marriage formed . . . in contravention . . . shall be utterly null
and void, and the issue . . . shall be regarded as bastards and incapable
of having or receiving any estate real, personal, or mixed by inheritance."
But of. Succession of Segura, 134 La. 84, 63 So. 640 (1913) (a white man
may acknowledge and legitimate children who are born to his colored con-
cubine although a statute prohibited marriage between white perzons and
persons of color, and provided that: "Natural fathers and mothers shall
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There is an additional cause of confusion and hardship to be
found in the conflict of laws rules applied by the different states
as to both their own statutes and those of sister states. To the
general conflict of laws rule that a marriage is valid everywhere
if valid where celebrated, there are undoubtedly certain excep-
tions. The three outstanding exceptions are incestuous mar-
riages, polygamous marriages, and those declared by law to
have no validity in the state of the domicil,22 on the ground that
they are so opposed to public policy that no state can afford to
recognize them on account of comity.23 Intermarriage between
races where prohibited by statute has generally been placed
within the last exception.2 -
Neither statutes nor judicial decisions are in accord in their
attitude toward marriages prohibited by the law of the domicil
when valid where celebrated. At least nine states have statutes
declaring that where two parties domiciled within the state
leave it in order to evade the state law and not only intend to
return but do return such marriage shall be held void.2 On the
have power to legitimate their natural children . . .provided that there
existed at the time of the conception of such children no other legal im-
pediments to the intermarriage of their natural father and mother ex-
cept those resulting from color or the institution of slavery").
22 Stevens v. Stevens, 304 Ill. 297, 136 N. E. 785 (1922); Heflinger v.
Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S. E. 316 (1923).
28 Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N. W. 787 (1908).
"If the contract of marriage is such in essentials as to be contrary to
the law of the country of domicil and it is declared void by that law, it is
to be regarded as void in the country of the domicil though not contrary to
the law of the country in which it was celebrated." See Kinney v. Com-
monwealth, 71 Va. 858, 864 (1878).
"Whatever validity might be attached in France to the singular marriage
contract [between free white person with a person of color] and subse-
quent unnatural alliance between the plaintiff and the deceased testatrix,
it is plain that, under the facts in evidence, the courts of Louisiana cannot
give effect to these acts without sanctioning an evasion of the laws and
setting at naught the deliberate policy of the state." See Dupre v. Boulard,
10 La. Ann. 411, 412 (1855).
24 Succession of Gabrisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907).
25 Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia and Texas. The Louisiana statute provides that where the parties
were formerly domiciled in Louisiana, in order that the marriage be recog-
nized in Louisiana, the parties must have acquired a domicil in the state
where the marriage was celebrated, and also that the marriage must have
been valid where celebrated. The Montana statute goes even further, pro-
viding that marriage in violation of the Montana statutory prohibitions, con-
tracted between residents of Montana outside of the state, shall be null
and void in Montana. And, finally, the Texas statute provides that "If
any white person and Negro shall knowingly intermarry with each other
within this state, or having so intermarried, in or out of the state, shall con-
tinue to live together is man and wife within this state, they shall be pun-
ished by confinement in the penitentiary for a term not less than two nor
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other hand, the statute in Nebraska states that all marriages
contracted out of the state which are valid where celebrated
shall be held valid in all courts and places in Nebraska. A mar-
riage was held valid under this statute where two parties, one
negro and the other white, residents of Nebraska, went to Iowa
for the sole purpose of evading the Nebraska law and returned
to Nebraska immediately after the ceremony. -6 Probably all
the states, with the possible exception of Texas, would recognize
the validity of a marriage between a white person and a Negro
if such marriage were valid both by the law of the domicil and
the place of celebration, though forbidden at the forum.2 7 In
several cases, parties domiciled in a state prohibiting such mar-
riages left the state for the purpose of evading its law, and were
married in a state allowing such marriages, having at the time
of marriage a bona fide intent not to return to the state of domi-
cil. In such cases, the marriages have been upheld.2' There
are certain other strange variations. Two states, Massachusetts
and Vermont, which do not themselves prohibit such mrriages,
make them void by statute if they would have been void at the
domicil of the two parties. 9 In contrast to this position, Cali-
fornia, which itself has a statute against such marriages, has
recognized the validity of a marriage between a negro man and
a white woman celebrated in Utah (where valid) with the ex-
press purpose of avoiding the prohibition existing in Mlissouri,
the domicil of both parties.20 As a result of the differences in
these statutes, the status, not only of the parties who marry in
more than five years." Tex. App. Civ. & Crim. Stat. (Vernon, 1920) Penal
Code, § 483.
26 State v. Hand, 87 Neb. 189, 126 N. W. 1002 (1910). The case nost
frequently cited to sustain this view is Midway v. Needham, 1G Dlass. 157
(1819), a pauper settlement case, in which it was held that a marriage be-
tween a mulatto and a white woman, both being domiciled in Dlassachusfttz,
was valid, although celebrated in Rhode Island in order to avoid the Mazza-
chusetts law. But in this ease the massachusetts statute had becn re-
pealed prior to the time of the action but subsequent to the time of the mar-
riage.
27Whittington v. McCasldll, 65 Fla. 162, 61 So. 236 (1913) (a marriage,
valid by law of Kansas, where celebrated and where the parties were domi-
ciled until the death of one, was recognized for the purpose of devolution of
property in Florida, although if it had been celebrated in Florida it would
have been void).
28 State v. Ross, 76 N. C. 242 (1877) ; Succession of Caballero, spma note
20. But marriages have been held void at the domicil, although valid
where solemnized, when the parties were married in another state for the
sole purpose of avoiding the law of their domicil. State v. Kennedy, 76 N.
C. 251 (1877) ; Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 463 (1924) ; Kinney
v. Commonwealth, supra note 23; see Succession of Caballero, jvpma note
20, at 574.
29 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 207, § 11; Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) § U515.
0 Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Calif. 120 (1875).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
violation of either the law of the forum or the law of the domicil
is uncertain, but the legal consequences resulting to children and
other interested parties is a subject of doubt.
In the future, as in the past, the state's attitude toward inter-
marriage between the races will be but a formal restatement
of what is generally believed to be sound public policy. If the
public policy is to become sound, it will have to be based on an
increasingly broad understanding of the factual consequences of
its policy. For facts alone can make possible intelligent de-
cisions as to whether is is advisable for the state to make such
marriages a criminal offense, to group such marriages with in-
cestuous and polygamous ones, and to legislate on questions
which may conceivably be more satisfactorily settled by economic
and social forces. If, after a study of the social consequences
resulting from such prohibitions, the state still feels the need of
legislation, what type of statute shall it draw? 81 What shall be
its attitude toward such marriages, if valid where celebrated, (1)
when contracted in good faith, and (2) when contracted with the
sole purpose of evading the law of the domicil? A survey of the
existing statutes and past decisions indicates that as yet there is
neither data nor enlightened public interest sufficient to insure
a socially desirable solution of the problems involved.
FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT AS A DEFENSE TO THE ENFORCEMENT
OF ARBITRATION CONTRACTS
A recent decision of the New York Supreme Court raises the
general question as to what effect should be given to allegations of
fraud when they are made by a defendant in proceedings brought
under the New York Arbitration Law for specific enforcement
of an arbitration agreement. 1 It appears that Cheney Brothers
and Joroco Dresses, Inc., executed (signed and delivered) paper
documents which recited the terms of a bargain of purchase and
sale between them. They also inserted an arbitration provision
apparently in the same papers. It is to be inferred that the de-
fendant, Joroco Dresses, Inc., refused to perform the terms, or
part of them, at least, of the purchase and sale bargain, and
that it refused to arbitrate any proposition. What reasons were
3 There is no question but that a state has the power to make the chil-
dren of such marriages legitimate or illegitimate. See Wolf v. Gall, 32
Calif. App. 286, 291, 163 Pae. 346, 348 (1917) : "The legislature could re-
move these disabilities. The right of inheritance of both legitimate and
illegitimate children alike is the creature of law, and can be changed at any
time and to any extent."
I Cheney Bros. v. Joroco Dresses, Inc., 219 N. Y. Supp. 96 (Sup. Ct.
1926).
The New York Arbitration Law is reported in N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill,
1923) 28.
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given, if any, for its refusal to carry out the purchase and sale
bargain are not reported. Cheney Brothers petitioned the New
York Supreme Court, pursuant to the New York Arbitration
Law, sections 3 and 4, for an order directing Joroco Dresses,
Inc., to proceed with an arbitration and to nominate one of the
board of arbitration. It is to be inferred that Joroco Dresses,
Inc., contested the petition, alleged that the contract was induced
by fraud, and demanded a trial by the court, if not by a jury,
of this question of fraud before the order should be granted. The
order was originally granted and the trial denied. On appeal,
however, the order was reversed in a per curiam opinion of six
lines. Two judges recorded their dissent. The opinion of the
court follows: "The order should be reversed, with $10 costs
and disbursements, and the motion to compel arbitration denied
with $10 costs, on the ground that the question as to whether or
not the contract was fraudulently induced raises an issue of fact,
which must be tried before the right to arbitration under the
contract may be enforced. If the contract was voided by fraud
the arbitration provision therein falls." 2
The pertinent sections of the New York Arbitration Law pro-
vide as follows:
Section 2. VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGRE EMENTS. A provision
in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy there-
after arising between the parties to the contract . . . shall
be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grouMds
as exist at law or in eqzity for revocation of any contract.
Section 3. REMEDY IN CASE OF DEFAULT. A party aggrieved by
the failure, neglect, or refusal of another to perform under a
contract . . . providing for arbitration, described in sec-
tion two hereof, may petition the supreme court, or a judge
thereof, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in
the manner provided for in such contract . . .. Service
thereof shall be made in the manner provided by law for personal
service of a summons. The court, or a judge thereof, shall hear
the parties, and upon being satisfied that the mekbig of the con-
tract or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court,
or the judge thereof, hearing such application, shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the contract. . . . If the 2izaking of the contract
- . . or the default be in issue, the court, or the judge thereof,
shall proceed swminarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be
demanded by either party, the court, or the judge thereof, shall
hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is raised,
any party may, on or before the return day of the notice of
application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and if such de-
mand be made, the court, or the judge thereof, shall male an
2The decision is of more than local importance because the sections of
the New York law which are here involved have been copied in the New
Jersey Arbitration Act, N. T. Laws 1923, c. 134; the Massachusetts Arbi-
tration Law, Mass. Acts 1925, c. 294; the Territory of Hawaii Arbitration
Law, Haw. Rev. Laws (1925) c. 171; and the United States Arbitration
Act, 43 Stat. 883, (1925) U. S. C. Tit. 9.
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order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner pro-
vided by law for referring to a jury issues in an equity action.
If the jury find that no written contract providing for arbitra-
tion was made, . . . or that there is no default, the proceed-
ings shall be dismissed. If the jury find that a written contract
providing for arbitration was made . . . and there is a de-
fault in the performance thereof, the court, or judge thereof,
shall make an order summarily directing the parties to the con-
tract . . . to proceed with the arbitration in accordance
with the terms thereof.I Section 4. PROVISIONS IN CASE OF FAILURE TO NAME ARBITRATOR
OR UMPIRE. If, in the contract for arbitration, . . de-
scribed in section 2, provision be made for a method of naming
or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such
method shall be followed; but if no method be provided therein,
or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to
avail himself of such method, or for any other reason there shall
be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or um-
pire, or in filling a vacancy, then, upon application by either
party to the controversy, the supreme court, or a judge thereof,
shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or um-
pire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said con-
tract . . with the same force and effect as if he or they
had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise pro-
vided, the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator. [Italics
are the writer's].
The opinion of the court indicates a readiness to allow an al-
legation of fraud in very general terms ("the contract was
fraudulently induced") to "raise an issue of fact, which must be
tried before the right to arbitration under the contract may be
Pnforced." The opportunity thus given to hinder and delay an
arbitration is obvious.
Is it necessary or plausible to hold that an allegation that "the
contract was fraudulently induced," made by a defendant to a
proceeding under section 3, puts in issue "the making of the con-
tract" as the latter words are used in that section so as to require
a trial by the court, or by the judge, or by a jury, before the ar-
bitration is granted? Consideration of this question naturally
prompts inquiry concerning the significance of the terms "the
making" and "the contract" as used in section 3. So far as ap-
pears it is not denied that Cheney Brothers and Joroco Dresses,
Inc., in fact signed and delivered the paper documents reciting
the terms of their purchase and sale bargain and the terms of
their arbitration agreement. Indeed, it is almost certain that
Joroco Dresses, Inc., technically admitted the factual execution
of the paper instruments with the terms therein which Cheney
Brothers sought to enforce. How, then, was "the making" of
the contract put in issue? Again, what is meant by "the con-
tract" as used in section 3? Does not the term refer to the paper
instruments and the words and signatures of the parties placed
thereon by the parties?
COMMENTS
It may be urged, however, that the foregoing terms do not re-
fer only to the factual execution of the paper bargain, but rather
that the term "the maldng" is used in section 3 in a general sense,
and that "the contract" comprehends the complex of legal conse-
quences which would ordinarily follow from a paper bargain
like the one in question, that is to say, legal relations co-extensive,
in general, with the terms of the factual bargain of the parties.
Consequently, as the argument would go, any allegations are
available by way of defense in proceedings under section 3,
which, if established, would make "the contract" "invalid,"
"void," "voidable" or "unenforceable." 3 The conclusion would
3 The various meanings which lurk in the term "contract" are admirably
set forth by Professor Corbin as follows: "The term contract has been
used -without much discrimination to refer to three different things: (1)
The series of operative acts of the parties e.\pressing their assent and re-
sulting in new legal relations; (2) the physical document executed by the
parties as an operative fact in itself and as the lasting evidence of their
having performed the necessary operative acts; (3) the relations resulting
from the operative acts, consisting of a right or rights in pcrsonam and
the corresponding duties, accompanied by certain powers, privileges and
immunities." Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Sone of the Rculltizg
Legal Relations (1916) 26 YALE LAW JOURxAL, 169.
Concerning "void," "voidable" and "unenforceable" contracts, Professor
Corbin continues as follows: "The term void contract is an apparent celf-
contradiction. This depends, however, upon the zense in which we are
using the term contract. In this case it appears to be used to refer to
the acts of offer and acceptance by the parties or to the document evi-
dencing such acts.
"In the case of a void contract, the parties perform acts that would
usually operate to create new contractual relations, but have no such op-
eration in the particular ease. Rights and other relations will. exist after
such a transaction, but they will not be contract rights and relations. A
contract right is a primary right in pcrsonam arising from expressions
of consent. In the case of a void contract, there are exprezsions of agree-
ment, but they do not have the usual legal effect. If these acts are mere
words, they are not operative facts at all. Standing alone, they have no
legal effect. They may, however, be accompanied by other acts, e. g., a
delivery of goods, that have legal operation. The legal relations consequent
upon these accompanying acts are never the ones that the parties had in
contemplation. The offer creates no legal power in the offeree; and if his
act of acceptance creates new legal relations, that is due to legal powers
that he possessed even before the offer was made.
"In the case of a voidable contract, the acts of the parties, even when
they are mere words, operate to create new legal relations, and these are
in a measure the ones contemplated by the parties. They are usually de-
scribed as rights and duties, privileges and powers, etc., just as in the case
of a valid contract; bst one of the parties has the additional power and
privilege of extinguishing them. The exercise of this power is dezcribed
as the disaffirmance or avoidance of the contract. Another way of describ-
ing a voidable contract is to say that the contemplated contractual rela-
tions do not yet exist, but that one of the parties has an irrevocable power
to create them. His subsequent act is then called ratification.
"The term unenforcible contract includes both void contracts and voidable
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be that to allege that "the contract was fraudulently induced"
clearly puts in issue "the making of the contract." 4
Whether or not the foregoing argument is a necessary or
plausible construction of this clause quoted from section 3, quite
clearly the argument must be considered when account is taken
of section 2 of the statute. In section 2 it is provided that writ-
ten arbitration agreements shall be valid, enforceable and irrevo-
cable, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." r Clearly, proceedings under
contracts. It is customarily used so as to describe certain other legal re-
lations also. When a contract has become unenforcible by virtue of the
statute of limitations, the obligor or debtor has a power to create a new
right in the other party as against himself (and to destroy his own exist-
ing privilege) by a mere expression of his will, without any act of assent
by the other and without a new consideration. He cannot, however, as in
a voidable contract, destroy the existing rights of the other party or create
new rights in himself as against that other. When a contract is unen-
forcible by reason of the statute of frauds, either party has the legal
power to create rights as against himself (or to terminate his existing
power of destroying the other's rights) by signing a written memorandum,
but he has no such power to create rights in his own favor. In these
cases a legal relation exists that is different from that existing in the
case of a void contract or a voidable one. It appears that this difference is
not as one author says, 'mainly a difference between substance and proced-
ure? The difference between a power to create a right against another
person and a power to create a right against only oneself is not merely
procedural.
"Both voidable and unenforcible contracts are like valid contracts in this:
there have been acts expressing agreement, and they are legally operative
facts creating new legal relations. The resulting legal relations are differ-
ent from those existing in the case of a valid contract; but these relations
are distinct in character, are of considerable practical importance, and de-
serve even better names than they have received." Corbin, op. cit. supra,
at 179 et seq.
4 The cases which have raised the question under section 3 have involved
only the question of the factual execution of the paper bargain for arbitra-
tion. In re Palmer & Pierce, Inc., 195 App. Div. 523, 186 N. Y. Supp.
369 (1st Dept. 1921); Edward Jordan-Kiel Co., Inc. v. Gresham & Co.,
Ltd., 202 App. Div. 211, 195 N. Y. Supp. 106 (1st Dept. 1922); Armstrong,
Inc., v. Silverman, 214 App. Div. 601, 212 N. Y. Supp. 832 (1st Dept. 1925) ;
cf. Hosiery M'f'g Corp. v. Goldston, 238 N. Y. 22, 143 N. E. 779 (1924).
A similar but distinct question has frequently arisen, namely: not
whether the parties did in fact agree in writing to arbitrate, but whether
the words and terms which they did in fact agree upon in writing are to
be construed as an agreement to arbitrate, Matter of Gen'l Silk Import-
ing Co., Inc., 198 App. Div. 16, 189 N. Y. Supp. 391 (1st Dept. 1921), 200
App. Div. 786, 194 N. Y. Supp. 15 (1st Dept. 1922), aff'd without opinion,
(Cardozo, J., dissenting) 234 N. Y. 513, 138 N. E. 427 (1922); Matter of
Bachmann, Emmerich & Co., 204 App. Div. 282, 197 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1st
Dept. 1923); see also Matter of Application of Amalgamated Ass'n of Ry.
Employees, 196 App. Div. 206, 188 N. Y. Supp. 353 (3d Dept. 1921) ; Mat-
ter of American Ins. Co., 208 App. Div. 168, 203 N. Y. Supp. 206 (1st
Dept.); Matter of Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 440, 143 N. E. 248 (1924).
r If the meaning of the clause "the making of the contract" as used in
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sections 3 and 4 for specific enforcement of a written agreement
to arbitrate are subject to this saving clause in section 2. From
this premise the argument might be restated as follows: an al-
legation that "the contract was fraudulently induced raises an
issue of fact," as stated by the court, and that this issue of fact
constitutes one of "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation ol any contract" as provided for in the saving
clause of section 2, and therefore, in the words of the court, the
issue "must be tried before the right to arbitration under the
contract may be enforced." The answer to this argument would
seem to lie in the answers to be made to the following questions:
(1) what contracts are embraced in section 2, and what is "the"
contract referred to in section 3 (whether or not "the contract,"
as the term is there used, refers only to the paper instruments
and the words and signatures thereon) ; (2) what is "the contract"
which is referred to by the court in its opinion---"the contract"
which is alleged to have been fraudulently induced?
It seems clear that section 2 of the Arbitration Law is con-
cerned only with a written arbitration contract, or "with a pro-
vision i& a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising between the parties to the contract." While
a "new public policy" is therein declared concerning arbitration
contracts, it does not embrace contracts generally. Quite clearly
the section distinguishes the arbitration contract or provision
from the terms of any other bargain (the purchase and sale bar-
gain in the instant case) which may be recited in the same
papers. That the parties would distinguish the two bargains
also seems clear. Whereas they would look to the purchase and
sale bargain for their profits they would look to the arbitration
contract or provision as ways and means of adjusting fortu-
itous disputes. That they entered into the whole convention
primarily for the sake of the purchase and sale and its profits
would be generally admitted. Indeed, the courts have already
section 3 is not restricted to the factual execution of the paper bargain
for arbitration as distinguished from the technical validity and enforcea-
bility of the paper bargain, the saving clause of section 2 is superfluous as
applied to proceedings under section 3. If, on the other hand, the meaning
of that clause is so restricted, then, as in the instant case, where a defense
to a proceeding under section 3 raises an issue under the saving clause of
section 2 but that defense does not put in issue "the maling of the con-
tract" in the restricted sense of that clause, the question arises whether a
jury trial of the issue is a matter of right to the parties. As has been
noted, section 3 expressly provides for such right when "the maling
of the contract" is put in issue and is seasonably demanded. The rcason
for such provision even in such cases is not clear in view of the fact that
proceedings under section 3 are tantamount to an equitable action for spe-
cific performance of writ en agreements to arbitrate. There would seem
to be nothing to require an extension of section 3 in this particular unlezs
ex-perience indicates marked efficiency of jury trial in similar cases.
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referred the arbitration contract or provision to the category of
"remedies" in contradistinction to the general commercial bar-
gain, and this is true although both bargains are recorded in a
single document.6 Equally clear, it is submitted, section 3 pro-
vides a procedure for the specific enforcement of written arbitra-
tion contracts only. Specific performance of contracts general-
ly is not contemplated in that section. Such contracts are made
specifically enforceable regardless of whether the accompanying
commercial bargain is or is not specifically enforceable under
present law. Like general comment seems permissible concern-
ing the exclusive application of section 4.7 In other words, it is
submitted that the Arbitration Law should be held to make writ-
ten arbitration contracts or provisions severable from the gen-
eral bargain which they may accompany, to which they may
refer, and out of which disputes may arise to be arbitrated, and
that this should be so even where all bargains are reported in
a single paper document. As a consequence, an allegation that
the contract was induced by fraud would not, when the term re-
ferred to the purchase and sale contract only, raise an issue of
fact to be tried by the court, or by a judge thereof, or by a jury,
before the arbitration agreement would be enforced. In the
light of this conclusion the following reason which was assigned
by the court for its decision is questioned: "If the contract was
voided by fraud the arbitration provision therein falls." (Italics
are the writer's].
At this point, however, the second question should be noted.
What does the court refer to by "the contract"-"the contract"
which is alleged to have been fraudulently induced? If "the con-
tract" refers to the purchase and sale bargain only, it has
just been urged that the arbitration contract or provision may
and should be deemed severable and enforceable under the Arbi-
tration Law. If the term "the contract" is meant to refer to
the arbitration contract or provision only, concededly, under the
saving clause of section 2 the allegation would raise an issue for
6 Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288
(1921) ; Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 100, 44 Sup. Ct. 274
(1924); Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 Fed. 319 (S. D. N. Y.
1921); In re Red Cross Line, 277 Fed. 853 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Atlantic
Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 Fed. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Lappe
v. Wilcox, 14 Fed. (2d) 861 (N. D. N. Y. 1926).
7"The primary purpose of the Arbitration Law was to make valid and
enforceable provisions for arbitration which had previously been regarded
as contrary to public policy, but it also provides a practical method for
the enforcement of such provisions and both the letter and spirit of the
statute require the courts to hold that this method was intended to apply
to all contracts 'to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising,,
both those which were regarded as valid before the Arbitration Law as
well as those which were regarded as contrary to public policy." See Mat-
ter of Fletcher, supra note 4, at 445, 143 N. E. at 249.
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a trial In the instant case, however, "the contract" is not so
particularized. The term may be designed to include the arbi-
tration contract or provision and it may not be so designed.
Would it not be a workable rule to ignore such a general alle-
gation? In other words, should not the alleged fraudulent in-
ducement specifically refer to the arbitration contract or pro-
vision before it is allowed to raise "an issue of fact which must
be tried before the right to arbitration under the contract may
be enforced"?
One more question deserves consideration. That question con-
cerns the construction of the terms of the arbitration contract or
provision. Certainly it may be argued that if any particular
contract or any of the terms of the whole paper agreement were
induced by fraud, it is neither plausible nor desirable to de-
cide that the parties agreed to arbitrate that question. Specula-
tion on "the intent" of the parties is probably the natural method
of attempting to make plausible what the particular court or
person passing on the question deems the most desirable de-
cision. If the parties have used words of general application, if
they have not specifically excepted this issue, in bargaining for
an arbitration, why should the issue be taken from the arbi-
trators? Are the arbitrators less competent to decide such
questions than other issues? 1 The reasons for taldng the issue
from the arbitrators should be made clearly to appear in order
to be convincing to the individuals, trade associations, chambers
of commerce, and other commercial and professional organiza-
tions, who believe in the effectiveness of arbitration as a business
economy and who look to the courts to aid in the making of its
efficiency. 10
8"Contending parties contracted that the merits of their controversy
shall be conditioned upon the report of arbitrators. Whether they have
so contracted is a question which the court must still determine for itself.
(Arbitration Law, § 3). If the contract has not been madc or is invalid,
the court will proceed, as in any other case, to a determination of the
merits. If it has been made and is val&d, the court will stay its hands till
the intrinsic fact is ascertained, and the condition thus fulfilled." [Italics
are the vriter's]. See Cardozo, J., in Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib &
Houlberg, supra note 6, at 275, 130 N. E. at 291.
0 Compare Matter of Application of Walter Rieb, 205 App. Div. 517, 199
N. Y. Supp. 704 (1st Dept. 1923); Priore v. Shermerhorn, 237 N. Y. 16,
142 N. E. 337 (1923) ; Wenger & Co. v. Proffer Silk, Hosiery Mills Co., 2.39
N. Y. 199, 146 N. E. 203 (1924); Matter of Hosiery MI'f'g Corp., 233 N.
Y. 22, 143 N. E. 779 (1924); Young v. Crescent Development Co., 240 N.
Y. 244, 148 N. E. 510 (1925) ; Bullard v. Grace Co., 240 N. Y. 33S, 143 N.
E. 559 (1925); In re Kelly, 240 N. Y. 74, 147 N. E. 368.
-0 What were the terms of the arbitration provision in the instant case
does not appear. If the provision was of the type quite generally used,
namely, an agreement to arbitrate "any dispute which may arise out of
this contract in the future," the following argument might be made: Since
the purchase and sale bargain was induced by fraud and since the de-
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By way of summary it is submitted: (1) that an allegation that
"the contract was fraudulently induced" should be ignored be-
cause of its generality; (2) that if an allegation of fraud is refer-
red to the arbitration contract specifically, an issue of fact is raised
under the saving clause of section 2 of the Arbitration Law,
"which must be tried [by the court, or by a judge thereof] be-
fore the right to arbitration under the contract may be en-
forced"; (3) that if the allegation of fraudulent inducement is re-
ferred to a purchase and sale or other accompanying bargain
only, it should be ignored unless the words in the arbitration con-
tract or provision exclude the issue.
W. A. S.
fendant has refused to perform and has repudiated that bargain because
of the fraud, no "this contract" exists out of which any dispute can arise to
be arbitrated.
The following answers to this argument are submitted: (1) It is mani-
festly plausible to hold that the meaning of the term "this contract" as
used in the foregoing arbitration contract or provision, at least includes
the paper bargain of purchase and sale in fact signed and delivered
by the parties, and that therefore "this contract" does exist. (2)
If the foregoing plausibility is denied then some convincing reason should
be set forth why this issue of fraudulent inducement should be taken from
the arbitrators when the parties have not specifically so provided in their
arbitration agreement.
